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Credit Rating Agency Regulation in the UK If and When Article 50 is Invoked: Round 
Holes for a Square Peg? 
Daniel Cash 
The decision taken by British voters to leave the European Union has created uncertainty in 
all walks of life, ranging from everyday concerns to professional anxiety. In this article, the 
focus is on the UK’s regulation of the Credit Rating Industry if and when Article 50 is 
invoked. The aim of the article is to examine some potential options available to 
policymakers and legislators in terms of their validity for taking on such an important task. 
Whilst it is not guaranteed that the UK will take sole responsibility for the regulation of 
credit rating agencies in its jurisdiction, it is likely. Therefore, assessing the credentials of 
the relevant agencies is a worthwhile endeavour. Yet, each option comes with its own set of 
issues, as will be discussed, so the article concludes by offering an option that may negate 
such issues whilst continuing to regulate the credit rating agencies efficiently and effectively.  
 
Introduction 
 
As this article is concerned with what may happen if and when Article 50 is invoked, thus 
triggering the UK’s secession from the European Union, it is important to begin with a 
number of caveats. Given the multitude of factors that may occur in the coming months (and 
potentially years), it is near impossible to speak with any certainty. So, with this in mind, the 
article operates on a number of premises that need to be expressed. Firstly, it is assumed here 
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that the UK Government will trigger Article 50 and begin the secession from the European 
Union; a number of prominent onlookers have suggested that this will not be the case (owing 
to the referendum result not being binding)1, but this article will not analyse those issues in 
any great depth. Secondly, the options discussed in this article are those that are the most 
likely to be considered by the UK Government should they be forced to regulate the rating 
industry directly; it is possible that a different regulatory path is taken (even creating a new 
regulator), but those considerations are far too abstract for this analysis. Also, and as will be 
discussed shortly, it is possible that the UK and EU will come to an arrangement where many 
of the current agreements in place remain, thus making this analysis purely academic; this 
may happen, but it is far from certain – the threat of a ‘hard-brexit’ may not come to fruition. 
Lastly, it may be the case that the Credit Rating Agencies leave the U.K. entirely, in which 
case the issue will be how the U.K. seeks to influence the actions of the agencies who would 
be passing judgement on British entities, but would not be physically present within their 
jurisdiction. With all that in mind, it is useful then to ask what the aim of this article is. 
 
This article has a number of research questions. To begin with it will be important to ask how 
is the credit rating industry currently regulated in the UK? Asking this question will give 
us an insight into the likelihood of the regime being maintained after the UK leaves the 
Union. We shall see in a moment that whilst the current system may be maintained because 
of the intricacy of the arrangement, there are a number of extremely important factors that 
threaten that system being retained, including issues of sovereignty, national economy, and 
                                                 
1 One prominent onlooker, Kenneth Clarke MP, suggests that MPs will block the Government from triggering 
Article 50 (The Government, for its part, suggests that it will not be consulting Parliament on the decision; this 
approach has been deemed ‘constitutionally inappropriate’ by a House of Lords Committee) see Anushka 
Asthana and Rowena Mason, Ken Clarke Tells Constituents: “EU referendum is not binding” The Guardian (13 
Sept. 2016); House of Lords Select Committee The Invoking of Article 50 (2016). 
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world standing. If this arrangement cannot be maintained, then it will be prudent to ask what 
are the options available within the UK regulatory framework for regulating the credit 
rating industry? At the moment there is a regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), 
which has been given the status of ‘competent authority’ in terms of supervising credit rating 
agencies in the UK so that they observe the rules set by the EU. However, there are a number 
of issues with the FCA that need to be considered which, in essence, means that the transition 
from supervisor to direct regulator is not as straightforward as it should be. Also, other 
regulators have certain strengths that may make the decision of selecting a regulator that bit 
more complicated. Therefore, upon analysing each of these options, the article will be asking 
how appropriate are these options? Furthermore, the pre-eminence of the former Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the USA are all examples of regulators that 
dominate(d) their regulatory frameworks; the new framework in the UK is based on one of 
collaboration, so the article will ask then sensible question of how may the choice of 
regulator be optimised? There is an argument to be had that collaboration between agencies 
may improve the effectiveness of rating agency oversight. However, the recent history of 
credit rating regulation, on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, suggests that we should be 
highly critical of any option available, so the article will conclude by asking how likely is it 
that an optimised approach will be implemented?  
 
Whilst it is important to proclaim what the article will cover, it is arguably even more 
important to look at what it will not cover. This is because of simple aspect – uncertainty. 
With the uncertain nature of a secession from an economic bloc, particularly within the world 
that we live in today, the analysis of this article could go on to fill volumes. There are 
important questions which may be asked, but are perhaps best reserved for either another 
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piece, or another time. Firstly, it is absolutely accepted that there may be no need whatsoever 
to discuss the British regulation of the agencies, because one of two things may occur. If the 
U.K. and the E.U. negotiate what is being labelled as a ‘soft-Brexit’, then it is highly likely 
that many regulatory arrangements will remain in place (probably including the ESMA 
regulation of the rating industry – financial regulation does not register in the public 
consciousness like other aspects of regulation do, for the most part). Also, if the rating 
agencies decide to rearrange their global positioning in response to Brexit and relocate their 
European subsidiaries to a European finance-Capital, like Paris or Frankfurt, then the U.K. is 
faced with a different proposition altogether. The issue then will be not how to regulate the 
industry, but how to attempt to influence the actions of an economically-important financial 
entity that does not have a presence within your jurisdiction – that analysis is certainly better 
reserved for another scholarly endeavour. This article therefore progresses forward with this 
major caveats in mind – however, at this point in time, academic analyses are useful but 
fraught with danger because, whilst we must try to be as critical as possible, we must remain 
focused. With that in mind, the article simply aims to facilitate a discussion on what may 
happen if the U.K. is forced to regulate the rating industry on its own terms.  
 
The Current Regulatory Framework in the UK 
All member states in the European Union are subject to the EU’s CRA III Regulation2, and 
under that regulation (and its predecessors) member states are required to designate a 
‘competent authority’ from within its own regulatory framework to supervise the rating 
agencies within its jurisdiction, and also to assist the EU regulator given the responsibility for 
regulating financial service providers, the European Securities and Markets Authority 
                                                 
2 Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 [2013] OJ L146/1. 
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(ESMA). In 2010 the UK Government, by way of Statutory Instrument, designated the now 
defunct Financial Services Authority (FSA) as its ‘competent authority’3; the disbanding of 
the FSA was recognised in a subsequent Statutory Instrument, within which the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) was to be designated as the UK’s ‘competent authority’4. The role 
of the FCA is, essentially, to conduct investigations on behalf of the ESMA and report 
breaches of the CRA III Regulation. The ESMA, in its role is the principal regulator for credit 
rating agencies in Europe, can also designate supervisory tasks to the FCA. 
 
There is another layer of regulation in the UK, in a sense, and that comes in terms of civil 
liability. As detailed in the Statutory Instrument adopted in 2013, a claim for civil damages 
can be brought against the agencies if the potential claimant can provide accurate and detailed 
information that a CRA has either: committed an infringement of CRA III, and that the 
infringement had an ‘impact’ upon the credit rating; damages were caused because of the 
infringement; and that the claimant ‘relied’ on the rating5. Even though there are a number of 
issues with the civil liability of rating agencies6, the Statutory Instrument does still provide an 
extra layer of oversight and accountability against the agencies in the UK 
 
                                                 
3 The Credit Rating Agencies Regulations 2010 (S.I. 2010/906). 
4 The Financial Services Act 2012 (Consequential Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Order 2013 (S.I. 
2013/472) s.188 (a)(ii). 
5 Credit Rating Agencies (Civil Liability) Regulations 2013 (S.I. 2013/1637). 
6 How to go about obtaining the ‘detailed and accurate’ information is another issue entirely, perhaps best 
demonstrated by the case of CalPERS in the US having to settle with Fitch Rating for incriminating information 
against Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, rather than financial compensation, in order to obtain such ‘detailed 
and accurate’ information (the same concept of ‘proof’ is in place in the United States). For more see CalPERS, 
CalPERS to Recover More than $300 Million from Standard & Poor’s in Investment Ratings Settlements 
(2015). Also, the removal of the reference to ratings within official regulations, in both the US and the EU, 
means that proving that one ‘relied’ on a rating is equally as difficult. These are just two reasons why there have 
been very few civil cases even brought against the agencies. 
6 
 
The current framework, in terms of its interconnection with the EU, will be much debated in 
the coming months and years. Whether or not it continues in the current format will be 
dictated by some momentous political decisions. For example, writing for the Harvard Law 
School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, Davis Polk and Wardwell 
LLP Managing Partner Thomas J Reid suggests that as EU regulations state that EU financial 
institutions can only use ratings for regulatory purposes that have been issued by a CRA 
registered with ESMA, the UK as a ‘third country’ (the status it will assume if it leaves the 
EU completely) will not be an appropriate base for rating agencies that have designs on 
having their products purchased in Europe (as The Big Three of S&P, Moody’s and Fitch 
do). As a result, Reid suggests that CRAs may be ‘pressurised to move certain of their EU 
activities from the UK and into the EU, where these activities can be directly regulated by 
ESMA’7. An alternative option, as discussed by Richard Whitman on behalf of Chatham 
House, is if the UK seeks to agree to a European Economic Area (EEA) relationship with the 
EU, which would result in the UK not being officially designated as a ‘third country’8. This 
would, in effect, maintain the current system and leave ESMA as the principal regulator for 
CRAs within the UK. However, some of the most publicised issues during the referendum 
campaign were sovereignty and immigration, and this EEA membership arrangement would 
fly in the face of what was decided; Whitman correctly realises that the EEA membership 
arrangement would mean that the UK was still subordinate to the EU in terms of regulation in 
this particular field (and others), and also that EEA membership still requires the acceptance 
of the free-movement principle whilst losing the power to veto certain policies (Turkey’s 
ascension to the Union, for example). Therefore, whilst the EEA membership arrangement 
                                                 
7 Thomas J. Reid, The Law and Brexit IV, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial 
Regulation (2016). 
8 Richard G. Whitman, The EEA: A Safe Harbour in the Brexit Storm, Chatham House (27 Jun. 2016). 
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idea is, theoretically, an acceptable idea in the short-term, it is unlikely to be adopted owing 
to the reality of the arrangement.  
 
On that basis it is now worth analysing the options available within the UK’s regulatory 
framework for taking over direct regulatory duties of the ratings industry. Supposing that 
Reid’s prophecy above, that CRAs will be pressurised into moving their operations into the 
EU after the triggering of Article 50, does not come to fruition, the strengths and weaknesses 
of UK regulators needs to be addressed. The current situation, whereby the FCA has only 
been supervising the agencies for the ESMA, leaves us with a remarkable opportunity to 
approach the regulating of the agencies from a new perspective; whether or not this 
opportunity is taken is another matter entirely. In the next three subsections we will be 
introduced to the three main components (arguably) of the UK’s regulatory framework that 
may be given the task of regulating the rating agencies: the Financial Reporting Council; the 
Prudential Regulation Authority; and the Financial Conduct Authority. 
 
The Financial Reporting Council 
 
It is worth mentioning before this subsection begins that both the Financial Reporting 
Council and the Prudential Regulation Authority are rank outsiders when it comes to being 
given the task of regulating the agencies post-brexit. The FCA, for reasons that will be 
discussed in the FCA’s subsection (but mostly because of its recent involvement with the 
regulation of CRAs) is the odds-on favourite to be given the responsibility. However, there 
are certain aspects of both the FRC and the PRA that mean to totally dismiss them could be a 
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mistake; regulating the agencies effectively and with the right aims in mind is crucial in this 
stage of the UK’s recovery from the Crisis, so analysing all available options is of crucial 
importance. 
 
The Financial Reporting Council was borne out of the dissolution of the Accounting 
Standards Committee (ASC) in 1990. Sir Ronald Dearing would suggest, whilst reviewing 
the ASC, that the standard-setting process within the accountancy field should be changed, 
and with that recommendation came the establishment of the Financial Reporting Council 
with Dearing as its Chairman9. On the face of it the FRC seems to be exclusively concerned 
with the accounting industry, but an analysis of their mission statement suggests that their 
scope could be broadened to include the regulation of credit rating agencies. 
 
The FRC state that their mission is to ‘promote high quality corporate governance and 
reporting to foster investment’10. They go on to state that ‘the capital markets are important to 
the health and growth of the economy… we help to ensure that investors have what they need 
to place their money with reasonable confidence that any risk is taken on an informed 
basis’11. This mission is clearly in line with the issue of credit rating agency regulation, which 
should be concerned with helping to provide investors with clear and reliable information 
upon which they can choose the risk that they can afford to take. 
 
                                                 
9 Pru Marriott, J R Edwards & Howard J. Mellett Introduction to Accounting 285 (SAGE 2002). 
10 Financial Reporting Council, The FRC and its Regulatory Approach 1 (2014). 
11 Id. 
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The FRC is indeed concerned with the accounting and actuarial industries, but it is also 
responsible for setting the UK Corporate Governance and Stewardship Codes. The FRC state 
that the UK Corporate Governance Code is based on the ‘underlying principles of good 
governance: accountability, transparency, probity and a focus on the sustainable success of an 
entity over the long term’12. These aspects are crucial if the UK is to directly take on the task 
of regulating the credit rating agencies, mostly because any element of mis-regulation can 
have a lasting and extremely damaging effect, as we saw with the financial crisis that had the 
credit rating agencies at the centre of it. We need a regulator to be pushing to make rating 
agencies more transparent, more accountable, and to push them into focusing on their own 
and everyone else’s long-term success. In this sense, the FRC seems to be a potential avenue 
to consider. 
 
However, there is one element of the FRC that arguably rules it out. One of the most 
important aspects of effective financial regulation, in terms of protecting investors (and more 
importantly the general public), is that the regulator must not be too close to the regulated 
entities; preferably, they should have no links to them at all unless it is to do with regulating 
them because of issues like the ‘revolving door’13 and ‘regulatory capture’14. Criticisms of the 
FRC make for uncomfortable reading in this regard, because the set-up of the body raises a 
number of suspicions as to its independence. The first warning sign comes from the FRC 
itself, when they state that their approach is based ‘as far as possible on facilitation rather 
                                                 
12 Financial Reporting Council 2. 
13 For a succinct explanation of the ‘revolving door’ concept, whereby regulators transition between regulatory 
office and the firms they are tasked with regulating, see Andrew Baker, Restraining regulatory capture? Anglo-
America, crisis politics and trajectories of change in global financial governance, 86 International Affairs 3 
(2010). 
14 There are a wide array of resources that discuss the nature of ‘regulatory capture’. For perhaps the most 
famous discussion see George J. Stigler The Theory of Economic Regulation 2 Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 3 (1971). 
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than dictation and on principles rather than rules’15. Whilst this facilitory approach is a 
genuine regulatory approach, it is no way appropriate for the credit rating industry due to its 
culture of maximising their position at the cost of investors (and arguably the same could be 
said of the accounting industry)16. What is worse than having a facilitory approach when 
regulating an industry that has proven itself to be callous in chasing profit is when the 
regulator depends on the regulated parties. The (BIS) Department for Business, Innovation & 
Skills (now called the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy) wrote in 2011 
that ‘the FRC is insufficiently independent from the accountancy professional bodies’ and that 
‘the independence of the FRC in this role is still governed by complex arrangements with the 
profession that sometimes inappropriately limit its independence and therefore its ability to 
pursue the public interest’. Even worse, the FRC ‘cannot launch an investigation until it has 
consulted the accountancy profession’17. This remarkable understanding essentially discounts 
the FRC from being in the running to regulate the rating agencies, because to have these 
issues when regulating an industry like the rating industry could lead to a collapse much 
worse than the Financial Crisis.  
 
The FRC has great aims in terms of regulating financial entities. However, its proximity to 
the regulated entities is disheartening to put it mildly. The performance of the accounting 
industry, in particular the Big Four firms, with regards to the financial crisis, was nothing 
                                                 
15 Financial Reporting Council, The FRC and its Regulatory Approach 3 (2014). 
16 There are a number of cases coming to light regarding the rating agencies abusing their position and 
fraudulently operating against the position of investors, with the CalPERS case being the most prominent. As 
for the accounting industry, the famous regulatory approach adopted after the scandals of the early 2000s had 
little to no impact upon their conduct, with the Big Four firms being prominent within the iniquities of 
marketplace in the lead up to the Crisis; facilitory regulation is not effective when faced with a certain culture. 
For more on the role of the Accounting firms in the Crisis see Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn, Conflicts trends and 
tensions in post-crisis reforms of transnational accounting standards in Tony Porter, Transnational Financial 
Regulation After the Crisis 182 (Routledge 2014). 
17 Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Proposals to Reform the Financial Reporting Council 11 
(2011). 
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short of scandalous. Recently, there have been claims that the FRC’s handling of the HBOS 
scandal is representative of the problems within the FRC, with one scholar claiming that the 
fact that the FRC’s Executive Director for conduct, Paul George, spent 14 years as a partner 
at KPMG (the focus of the investigation) is a clear example of a regulator that is too close to 
those who it regulates18. 
 
However, it is claimed that an FRC insider suggested the reason for their lax approach to 
investigating KPMG’s auditing of HBOS was because of a lack of resources19. This may 
seem like an easy excuse for incompetence, but the BIS wrote in 2011 that the UK 
Government would want the FRC to cut their costs20, which tallies with the claims of the 
FRC insider. When understood alongside the actual mechanics of the FRC, this is an 
incredibly worrying sign. If we accept that financial regulators usually lessen their vigilance 
as we move further away from the most recent financial downturn21 (for a number of reasons, 
including cost-cutting), then all of these factors mean that not only should the FRC not be 
considered for regulating the rating agencies, but radical reform is required for their 
regulation of the accounting industry. However, that analysis is for another day. For now, it 
will be useful to look at the next potential contender, the Prudential Regulation Authority. 
 
                                                 
18 Harriet Agnew, Accounting experts seek independent probe into KPMG’s audit of HBOS, Financial Times (25 
Jan. 2015). 
19 Bob Tricker & Gretchen Tricker, Business Ethics: A Stakeholder, Governance and Risk Approach 142 
(Routledge 2014). 
20 Id 7. 
21 James K. Galbraith, The End of Normal: The Great Crisis and the Future of Growth 157-8 (Simon and 
Schuster 2015). 
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The Prudential Regulation Authority 
 
The Prudential Regulation Authority, which was formerly a subsidiary of the Bank of 
England but now, after the Bank of England and Financial Services Act 2016, is the Bank of 
England, was formed alongside the Financial Conduct Authority from the termination of the 
Financial Services Authority. It is the UK’s prudential regulator for deposit-taking 
institutions such as banks, building societies, and credit unions, as well as insurers and major 
investment firms and in so doing regulates around 1,700 firms22. Its role, primarily, is to be 
concerned with the safety and soundness of the financial system, within which it provides for 
rules governing the internal management of a given financial institution; setting rules for 
insuring the levels of capital that a bank must hold in reserve, for example. 
 
The PRA is perhaps the most straightforward regulator on our list. Although the PRA is not 
an obvious contender to be regulating the credit rating industry, as it is concerned with 
aspects such as interest rates and other similar things which have a direct impact upon the 
delicate balance of the national economy, there are two factors which suggest that it may be a 
stronger contender than first thought. Firstly, it must be recognised that the UK has had no 
experience of directly regulating the rating agencies, so the obligation apparently imposed 
upon the FCA is not as guaranteed as one may think. Secondly, the Bank of England states 
that its principal aim is to make sure ‘that the system runs smoothly and that people can trust 
financial institutions’23; the notion of ‘trust’ is perhaps the most vital component to the future 
                                                 
22 Nirmala Lee, Prudential Regulation Authority in Samuel O. Idowu, Nicholas Capaldi, Matthias Fifka, 
Liangrong Zu, & René Schmidpeter, Dictionary of Corporate Social Responsibility: CSR, Sustainability, Ethics 
and Governance 428 (Springer 2015). For more on the PRA see Elisabetta Montanaro, Financial Regulation in 
the United Kingdom from the Big Bang to Post-Crisis Reforms in Jan Kregal, Rainer Kattel, & Mario 
Tonveronachi, Financial Regulation in the European Union (Routledge 2015). 
23 Bank of England About the Bank: What Does the Bank Do? (2016) (emphasis added). 
13 
 
of rating agency regulation. Therefore, this notion of increasing the trust in financial 
institutions, combined with the centrality of the ratings of the agencies to the operations of 
the firms that the PRA regulates, means that there is potential for the PRA to take a central 
role in a new regulatory framework around the rating agencies. This would probably be best 
within a system that is imagined later in the article (with regards to a specialised Office), but 
before we analyse that it is important to ask whether there are any issues with the way in 
which the PRA regulates the 1,700 firms. 
 
The most prominent criticism of the PRA has been with regards to its transparency. The best 
way to meet the Bank’s aims of encouraging trust in financial institutions is to have them, 
and its own regulation of those institutions, be as transparent as possible. Yet, the Treasury 
Select Committee is investigating a complaint about the PRA and its reluctance to reveal 
details about a particular bank’s level of capital buffers, which lead Sam Woods, the new 
head of the PRA, to state that he will ‘look again with an open mind’ into whether the PRA 
could, in general, be more transparent24. However, the proposal offered at the end of this 
article may negate worries regarding the potential lack of transparency at the PRA (which, in 
reality, is not as big an issue as with other regulators). Before that however, we will now 
assess the favourite to be given the task of regulating the rating agencies, the Financial 
Conduct Authority. 
 
                                                 
24 Caroline Binham, FCA criticised for being too “defensive”, Financial Times (20 Jul. 2016). For the original 
story of the Treasury Select Committee’s investigation into the claim see Caroline Binham, Watchdog urged to 
disclose more information about banks, Financial Times (7 Jun. 2016) and The Commons Select Committee 
PRA Should Consider Public Disclosure Policy (2016). 
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The Financial Conduct Authority 
 
The Financial Conduct Authority was established in 2013 alongside the PRA, after the 
dissolution of the Financial Services Authority; legally speaking, the FCA is the same 
corporate body as the FSA (which was previously the Securities and Investment Board 
created in 1986)25. Whilst the PRA focuses on the overarching stability of the economy by 
way of intervening in the operations of deposit-taking firms, the FCA has a similar mandate 
albeit via a different focus. In what is a representative claim from the FCA, the Authority 
aims to ‘intervene early in wholesale markets to mitigate the risk of harm being transmitted to 
retail customers’. In line with the PRA’s mandate as discussed earlier, the FCA believes that 
‘market efficiency, cleanliness and resilience is delivered through transparency, surveillance 
and the supervision of infrastructures, as well as their principal users’26. It is clear to see that 
the FCA and PRA are attempting to sing from the same hymn sheet, but the FCA focusses 
more on the ‘consumers’ interaction with the financial services rather than the PRA which 
focusses more on the interaction between the financial services and the economy as an ideal.  
 
The FCA regulates a wide array of financial firms, ranging from Banks, Building Societies 
and Credit Unions (in a different capacity to the PRA), to consumer credit firms, financial 
advisors, and Wealth Fund Management Firms. Apart from regulating the wholesale financial 
services arena, the FCA is also responsible for regulating the listing process, recognising 
investment exchanges, and other trading platforms27. The FCA derives its powers from the 
                                                 
25 Ashley Kovas, Understanding the Financial Conduct Authority: A Guide for Senior Managers 4 (Troubador 
Publishing 2015). 
26 Financial Conduct Authority Enhancing Market Integrity (2016). 
27 HM Treasury A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Building a Stronger System 60 (2011).  
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Financial Services and Markets Act 200028 (as amended by the Financial Services Act 201229 
and in part by the recent Bank of England and Financial Services Act 201630). From that 
statutory instruction, the FCA must have regard to a number of important and interesting 
principles. They must have regard to: the differing degrees of risk involved in different kinds 
of investment; the differing degrees of experience and expertise that different consumers may 
have; the need that consumers may have for the timely provision of information; the general 
principle that consumers should take responsibility for their decision; and the general 
principle that those providing regulated financial services should be expected to provide 
customers with a level of care that is appropriate31. Additionally, the FCA makes clear that it 
defines a ‘consumer’ as: retail customers buying financial products or services such as 
mortgages or ISAs; retail investors in financial instruments (such as shares or bonds); and 
wholesale customers, such as regulated firms buying products or making investments, or 
issuers looking to raise capital32.  
 
It is clear then from the mandate above, and the definition of a ‘consumer’, that the ratings of 
the agencies are central to the concerns of the FCA. Apart from aspects such as ‘retail 
customers’ (not directly anyway), the credit rating agencies play an important role in each 
realm that the FCA is tasked with regulating. Although retail investors are likely to depend on 
other measures (like yield rates and credit spreads) rather than just credit ratings, the ratings 
are available to retail investors (in one form or another)33 and provide another stream of 
                                                 
28 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 [2000] c.8. 
29 The Financial Services Act 2012 [2012] c.21. 
30 Bank of England and Financial Services Act 2016 [2016] c.14. 
31 Ashley Kovas, Understanding the Financial Conduct Authority: A Guide for Senior Managers 5 (Troubador 
Publishing 2015). 
32 Id. 
33 Credit ratings are not as available as we are usually led to believe, despite what some may say. For an analysis 
of this factor, which is an important when we consider the reverence attached to the availability of the ratings of 
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information and analysis that may affect their investment decision. Furthermore, wholesale 
customers rely heavily on the ratings of agencies, irrespective of the new regulatory 
movement to remove any reference to the ratings of agencies from official regulations34, and 
issuers of debt are fundamentally tied to credit rating agencies ever since the early 1970s35. 
What this means is that the FCA is, arguably, ideally placed to regulate the agencies because 
it can, at once, manage the operations of the agencies and also review the effect of that upon 
the main users of the ratings. 
 
However, as with the FRC and the PRA, there are issues with the FCA that need to be 
addressed. In terms of the regulatory approach of the FCA, there are two issues that stand out 
above all else. Firstly, the Treasury stated when discussing how the new FCA would operate 
that the Government believes that the FCA’s regulatory approach must be ‘pursued in a way 
which recognises not only the limitations of regulation, but also the potentially negative 
effects of excessive regulation on market efficiency and consumer choice’36. This pro-market 
viewpoint is extraordinarily dangerous, as proven by the recent Financial Crisis, and is 
particularly disrespectful to those who have paid the price for the iniquities of the 
marketplace. Adopting this philosophical approach when regulating the credit rating 
agencies, if that does indeed become the case, will lead to financial crises again and again. 
                                                 
agencies, see Herwig P. Langohr & Patricia T. Langohr, The Rating Agencies and Their Credit Ratings: What 
They Are, How They Work, and Why They Are Relevant 173 (John Wiley & Sons 2010). 
34 The Dodd-Frank Act made the removal of references to rating agencies central to its new approach to rating 
agencies, see The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 Pub. L. 111-203, H.R. 
4173 s.939. With regards to companies still relying on the ratings, even after regulatory reliance was removed, 
see Robert J. Rhee, On Duopoly and Compensation Games in the Credit Rating Industry 108 Northwestern 
University Law Review 89 91 (2013) - Rhee discusses how shareholders often dictate the investment options 
available to their managers of their companies by restricting their investments to products that carry a AAA 
rating (for example). 
35 Naciri explains that after the collapse of Penn Central, the agencies began to charge issuers to signal to 
investors that they could repay their debt, which was the birth of the issuer-pays system, see Ahmed Naciri, 
Credit Rating Governance: Global Credit Gatekeepers 16 (Routledge 2015). 
36 HM Treasury A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Building a Stronger System 60 (2011). 
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The second concerning element with regards to the philosophical approach of the FCA is its 
penchant for encouraging competition37. Although this is built into the Authority’s mandate, 
that fact alone may show why the FCA is not designed to regulate the rating agencies – 
therefore, potentially, leading us to conclude that either the FCA would need to be 
redesigned, or that the rating agencies would need to be regulated by another regulator (or in 
a specifically designed form). The FCA focus upon competition because in a number of fields 
competition can be a positive element and result in positive outcomes for the consumer. 
However, the global credit rating industry is what is known as a ‘natural oligopoly’38, which 
essentially means that the productivity, accuracy, and general usefulness of the rating 
industry will decrease if competition is encouraged (there are also a number of barriers to 
increased competition within the industry i.e. reputational capital). This aspect alone may be 
the determining factor when it comes to regulating the industry. 
 
There is another element that is particularly concerning. There have been complaints made 
against the FCA regarding their handling of official complaints against market actors39. The 
Financial Complaints Commissioner is said to have personally seen ‘examples of an 
unwillingness to face up to shortcomings… and delays in dealing with “awkward cases”’40. If 
the FCA takes the lead on regulating the rating agencies, it will receive complaints about their 
conduct; if they are considered to be ‘awkward cases’ and subsequently dealt with in an 
inappropriate fashion, the consequences of that could be severe. 
 
                                                 
37 Financial Conduct Authority Enhancing Market Integrity (2016). 
38 For a representative discussion of the rating industry as being a ‘natural oligopoly’ see David F. Tennant & 
Marlon R. Tracey, Sovereign Debt and Credit Rating Bias 54 (Palgrave Macmillan 2015). 
39 Caroline Binham, FCA criticised for being too “defensive”, Financial Times (20 Jul. 2016). 
40 Id. 
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These criticisms are valid and worrying. It is highly likely that the FCA will be given the task 
of regulating the rating agencies if that role is required in the post-brexit UK, which although 
seems rational has the potential to result in a flawed regulatory arrangement where flaws 
often result in massive financial catastrophes. Yet, as the current regulatory framework 
stands, it is the best option available. Whilst we cannot accurately predict what course of 
action may be taken, it is worthwhile discussing how that current framework may be adapted 
in order to accommodate the regulation of the rating agencies within it, without losing any 
efficiency or effectiveness. The article will now present a brief idea that may be appropriate if 
the UK regulatory framework is tasked with accommodating the direct regulation of the 
agencies. 
 
“The Office of Credit Rating Agency Regulation” 
 
It is unlikely that the UK Government would create a new regulator to regulate the credit 
rating industry. But, as we have seen above, the current framework has crucial flaws in that 
will no doubt be exploited by the rating agencies. Therefore, what is required, arguably, is 
another layer of protection. In adapting the ideas of the Dodd-Frank Act and Robert J Rhee, 
what is proposed here is a specially designated ‘Office of Credit Rating Agency Regulation’ 
that sits within one of the regulatory authorities discussed above.  
 
In the US, section 932 of the Dodd-Frank Act established an Office of Credit Ratings within 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), with its mandate being to ‘promote 
accuracy in credit ratings issued by Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisations 
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(NRSROs)… [and] to ensure that such ratings are not unduly influenced by conflicts of 
interest’41. Rhee suggests that if additional expertise or input is needed, the Office could be 
composed of ‘regulators, academics, and disinterested industry professionals who would be 
tasked with analysing performance and making recommendations as to the award of bonus, 
and could incorporate additional methods such as an industry survey of investors and other 
knowledgeable constituents’42. Whilst the idea of establishing an Office and then 
supplementing it with outside opinions is a good one, it does not go far enough (there are 
already concerns as to the sentiment afforded to the Office by the SEC43). Firstly, it does not 
counteract the issues within the host regulator. Secondly, the range of input from the ‘outside’ 
needs to be much wider, so that the chances of the Office being ‘captured’ are reduced. 
Thirdly, the chain of command makes the establishing of the Office a naturally-limited 
exercise at best. 
 
So, with that in mind, and progressing on the assumption that the FCA will be appointed to 
regulate the ratings industry, it is proposed here that a specialised Office be established 
within the FCA. However, rather than just being the focal point of the FCA’s regulation of 
the rating agencies, and reporting directly back to them, the Office would also be mandated to 
report to a Parliamentary Select Committee (presumably the Treasury Select Committee) 
twice every year, to report on the regulation of the agencies and the conduct of the FCA in 
regulating the agencies and supporting the Office in its mandate. In order for this chain of 
command to work, the Office would have to be chaired by someone who was not a member 
                                                 
41 Robert J. Rhee, On Duopoly and Compensation Games in the Credit Rating Industry 108 Northwestern 
University Law Review 89 133 (2013). 
42 Id. 
43 Darbellay and Partnoy note how the Office for Credit Ratings went unstaffed for 12 months, see Aline 
Darbellay & Frank Partnoy, Credit Rating Agencies and Regulatory Reform in Claire A. Hill, James L 
Krusemark, Brett H McDonnell, & Solly Robbins, Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law 280 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2012). 
20 
 
of staff within the FCA. In addition to this, the regulatory panel that would make up the 
directorate of the Office would have to be mandatorily diverse in terms of background. For 
example, there would be a limit on the representation of (a) established regulators and (b) 
members of the economic profession (broadly defined). The reason for this is that the actions 
of the major financial players before 2007/08 brought society to its knees and the general 
public are continuing to pay for those iniquities. Financial Regulators and their philosophical 
knowledge base, the economic discipline, cannot be allowed to reign supreme when it comes 
to regulating such socially-vital entities. So, in that vein, the constitution of the regulatory 
panel of the Office would have to consist of a regulatory representative, a legal expert, an 
expert in the social effect of the economy (i.e. an economic sociologist), an economist, a 
disinterested regulatory professional (possibly a retired regulator) and potentially a 
representative from a non-profit credit rating agency (although there are a number of issues to 
be discussed in relation to this)44. The constitution of the panel is not strictly defined, but 
there must be an element of representing society when regulating the industry, rather than just 
analysing them from an economic perspective; that has been tried and resulted in the largest 
economic failure since the Great Depression.  
 
This approach could work, although as with any proposal there are a multitude of concerns 
that would have to be discussed. However, whilst a debate on that proposal would be 
welcome, it is the debate on what may affect the UK Government’s regulatory approach 
which is of a more pressing concern. Before the article concludes there will be a brief 
discussion on just some of the factors that will have to be taken into account; how much 
weight the Government will attach to these factors we cannot know, but it goes without 
                                                 
44 For more on the issue of non-profit rating endeavours see Daniel Cash, The International Non-Profit Credit 
Rating Agency: The Viability of a Response 37 The Company Lawyer 6 (2016). 
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saying that the survival and prosperity of the United Kingdom will be its primary concern – 
what this means for the regulation of financial entities, entities that proved themselves to be 
venal when the opportunity strikes, is a massive concern. 
 
Factors 
 
The transition away from the European Union provides the UK Government with a number 
of opportunities, but also brings with it a number of potential hazards. How it emerges from 
the separation will, arguably, set the tone for its development for a number of years to come. 
However, in order to speculate about what may happen in the UK’s short-, medium-, and 
long-term future, it is appropriate to discuss the factors that may affect the decisions that the 
UK’s leadership will be forced to take. Although there are many aspects that will affect the 
decisions that will be taken, two stand out as immediate concerns for the UK and its 
regulatory system. 
 
The first of these concerns is the potential for the increase of ‘regulatory arbitrage’45. 
Essentially, regulatory arbitrage is when an entity moves between regulatory systems to 
reduce the regulatory burden upon them; there are a number of issues that arise from this 
practice, with the most noticeable being the potential for increasing systemic risk46. Yet, for 
our discussion, the pressures that come with regulatory arbitrage, for the regulator, can be 
extremely influential. Earlier we saw how it is thought that the invoking of Article 50 will 
                                                 
45 For a definition and discussion about regulatory arbitrage see Jeffrey Carmichael & Michael Pomerleano, The 
Development and Regulation of Non-bank Financial Institutions 40 (World Bank Publications 2002). 
46 Id. 
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result in the flight of the rating agencies to the EU in order to comply with the EU 
regulations; the knock-on effect, in terms of regulatory arbitrage, would be for the UK to 
weaken their regulatory approach towards the rating agencies in order to keep them operating, 
and contributing, within the UK. This is recognised as being the fertile ground for a 
‘regulatory race-to-the-bottom’47; this potential has been widely recognised by expert 
onlookers (including rating agencies themselves)48. The effect of this race-to-the-bottom 
should be all too obvious, but one scholar, talking in general terms about regulatory arbitrage, 
captures the essence of the pressures that may face the U.K: 
In the financial realm, regulators face pressure to relax regulations to discourage 
investors and financial institutions from shifting capital to less regulated markets. 
Capital flight can lower regulatory budgets, decrease their power by diminishing the 
firms and capital under their jurisdiction, and anger key constituents49. 
The effects mentioned by Gerding are of direct importance to the considerations of the UK 
because of one particular aspect; the jewel in the crown – The City of London. 
The second concern that, arguably, will weigh the heaviest upon the decision-makers in the 
UK is how best to protect and advance the City of London’s fortunes throughout the Brexit 
process. The reason for this is quite simple; the fortunes of the City of London, both literally 
and figuratively, are an accurate gauge of how the UK will fare in the coming years. The 
financial services sector is responsible for 9.6% of national output, with the professional 
services contributing a further 4.9%. The UK is currently the world’s largest exporter of 
                                                 
47 Erik F. Gerding, Law, Bubbles, and Financial Regulation 159 (Routledge 2013). 
48 A number of expert onlookers have recognised the potential for regulatory arbitrage. Just some include: 
Deloitte, Closer Look: Brexit – What Now for US Banks and Capital Market Firms? 6 (2016); Alex Barker, Jim 
Brunsden, & Michael Stothard, Brexit – an existential problem for London and Paris, Financial Times (19 Feb. 
2016); Christopher Baker & Erin Davies, Brexit’s Headwinds Not Enough to Sink Banks, Morningstar (29 Jun. 
2016). 
49 Erik F. Gerding, Law, Bubbles, and Financial Regulation 159 (Routledge 2013). 
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financial services, ultimately generating a trade surplus of over £47bn in 2011 alone. As for 
the City of London itself, it is estimated to have contributed £35bn to the UK’s national 
output in 2012, whilst London as a whole contributed £10bn more to the exchequer than it 
drew out in public spending50. What is clear is that the fortunes of the Country and the 
fortunes of the financial services sector, which is dominated by the City of London, are 
intrinsically intertwined. What this means then is that any decision the UK Government will 
take will be based on a consideration of what is best for the City. This is rational, of course, 
but has worrying connotations. If it is deemed that to protect and advance the City there must 
be conscious effort to be seen to be ‘open for business’, which translates to a moderating of 
the regulatory approach, then the effects upon society may be grave. The proximity, with 
regards to time elapsed, to the Financial Crisis results in a simple question: is society ready 
for another crisis? The answer to that, either way, is rather dispiriting. 
 
Conclusion 
This article aimed to assess the regulatory options available to the UK with respects to 
regulating the credit rating industry. There are a lot of unknowns, admittedly, which make an 
exercise like this academic; it is hardly a stretch to imagine the U.K. coming to an agreement 
with the EU to keep the financial regulatory system very similar to the arrangement that 
exists today. However, that should not discourage such endeavours. The aim was to assess 
the options and that has been done; there are some options available but only one stands out 
above the rest – the FCA. The Financial Conduct Authority stands out above the other 
regulators, but its conduct and composition leave a lot to be desired. With what will be a 
crucial task, the question marks that will hang over the FCA regulation of the agencies are 
                                                 
50 City of London Corporation, An Indispensable Industry: Financial Services in the UK 4 (2013). 
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question marks that will have a direct effect upon society. With that being said, there are 
options available that will optimise the current framework and seek to protect investors, and 
most importantly the public. 
 
The article ultimately proposed that a multi-disciplinary Office of Credit Rating Agency 
Regulation be established that would answer to the FCA and a Parliamentary Committee. The 
Office would operate in a different manner to the Office set-up in the US under the 
supervision of the SEC, because the attitude shown towards that idea has not been 
encouraging in the slightest. The idea as briefly presented here can work, but whether or not 
it would ever be adopted is another issue entirely.  
 
That other issue is the factors that will affect the decisions taken by the UK Government 
when negotiating the UK’s secession from the European Union. There is no denying that 
there is very little chance of the UK Government prioritising forward-thinking, socially-
responsible financial regulation at a time when they need to encourage the largest of firms to 
stay in the UK, and to encourage trade not to abandon the UK in the face of uncertainty. 
Unfortunately, this position of desperation will be capitalised upon, but by the very entities 
that brought society to its knees. The UK has a fantastic opportunity to design a specific 
regime for the regulation of credit rating agencies and protect the citizens of the UK from the 
culture that has eroded the ethics within the industry51, but it is feared here that the pressures 
facing the UK as a response to the decision taken by the British electorate on June 23rd 2016 
                                                 
51 Theodore R. Malloch & Jordan D. Mamorsky, The End of Ethics and a Way Back: How to Fix a 
Fundamentally Broken Global Financial System 47 (John Wiley & Sons). 
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will be too much and the UK, in trying to preserve its global status, will sink ever deeper into 
the clutches of those that decimated society in 2007/08. 
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